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NOTES 
SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS AND A 
COMPARISON OF APPROACHES TO SEXUAL 
LIBERTY 
William Council* 
 
Over 150 years ago, Congress passed and the states ratified the 
Fourteenth Amendment, banning states from passing or enforcing laws based 
on unconstitutional classifications and protecting persons in the United 
States from adjudication without due process.  For over one hundred years, 
however, courts and commentators have been fighting over the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s Due Process Clause’s controversial protections of substantive 
rights.  The U.S. Supreme Court has applied inconsistent methodologies to 
these substantive due process claims, attempting to walk a tightrope between 
the Court’s power to subjectively announce new rights as “fundamental” and 
the traditional role of the states’ plenary police powers. 
The Court’s ability to announce new subjective rights has morphed and 
evolved over time—both in terms of the rights elevated, ranging from 
economic rights to contraception, child-rearing, and, most recently, 
marriage equality, and the methodology used to elevate those rights.  Against 
this backdrop, there currently is a circuit split regarding the status of state 
laws criminalizing the sale of sex toys.  According to some, these devices are 
an essential element of sexual liberty and their criminalization represents 
paradigmatic government overreach.  Conversely, supporters of state laws 
criminalizing sex toys believe their regulation falls within the states’ 
traditional authority to legislate questions of moral judgment. 
This Note examines the tension between these two conceptions of sex toy 
regulation and criminalization and the broader ramifications for substantive 
due process methodology.  Since choosing whether or not to use sex toys is a 
consequential decision implicating sexual autonomy and privacy, state laws 
that burden their use unconstitutionally step into the protected sphere of 
liberty that the Fourteenth Amendment protects. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Online retailers, brick-and-mortar shops, and other vendors sell a wide 
variety of sex toys to individuals and their partners that comport with their 
private desires and needs.  However, no sale of sex toys will occur in 
Alabama where the state legislature has criminalized the sale of sexual 
devices, declaring them immoral.1  Decisions regarding sexual privacy and 
expression are some of the most intimate and private that individuals and 
couples make.2  In the United States, consenting adult couples are relatively 
free to engage in relationships as they see fit.3  Further, while marriage 
equality for same-sex couples has existed for a short period since 2015, the 
law now legally protects the LGBTQIA+ community’s sexual liberty4 and 
grants it equal status.5  At the same time, states and the federal government 
 
 1. ALA. CODE § 13A-12-200.2 (2020) (banning the sale of devices that stimulate human 
sexual organs). 
 2. See Donald H. Herman, Pulling the Fig Leaf Off the Right of Privacy:  Sex and the 
Constitution, 54 DEPAUL L. REV. 909, 912 (2005). 
 3. See Aziza Ahmed, Adjudicating Risk:  AIDS, Crime, and Culpability, 2016 WIS. L. 
REV. 627, 630 (discussing a variety of laws that criminalize sexual activity or nondisclosure 
of status by HIV-positive persons).  These laws exist with other laws that criminalize some 
forms of consensual sex.  However, this Note does not address those issues; rather, it focuses 
on consenting adults’ (who do not have HIV or a similar condition implicating other laws) 
choices to use sex toys. 
 4. See infra Part I.E (discussing Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015), and the 
legalization of same-sex marriage). 
 5. See infra Part I.E. 
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regulate many aspects of our private lives.6  For instance, states regulate 
marriage and divorce,7 nearly all states have laws banning polygamy and8 
bestiality9 and proscribing sex before the age of consent,10 and many states 
prohibit marriage between first cousins.11 
These regulations are commonly justified as protecting individuals from 
harm and coercion.  However, many laws prohibiting private sexual conduct 
are justified solely under a pretense of “morality”—that is, a state using its 
criminal code to advance its own conception of morality by invading private 
decisions and criminalizing private, sexual conduct.  This includes laws 
criminalizing the sale or possession of sex toys. 
Laws targeting private, sexual decisions are primarily state driven, 
although there is tension between state and federal powers.  Principles of 
federalism dictate that state governments should serve as the primary 
regulators of their citizens through the exercise of their police powers.  At 
the same time, the Fourteenth Amendment incorporates the Bill of Rights 
against the states, requiring the equal protection of the laws and guaranteeing 
due process, thus restricting the permissible scope of state action.12 
While scholars and commentators have considered the impact of sex toy 
regulations,13 the issue has not received as much attention in scholarship or 
from the media as it may deserve.  But the impact of regulations banning sex 
toys is far-reaching and the devices are hardly taboo to those who need them 
or would like to include them as part of their sexual experiences.  Legal 
proscriptions against their use overtly limit and criminalize consenting 
adults’ sexual liberty; they limit certain couples, particularly those with 
 
 6. This Note explores the concept of morality as a justification for laws.  Since the 
Mayflower Compact, lawmakers have justified many laws on morality grounds. See Sally 
Turner, The Health Benefits of Sex Toys, PATIENT (Sept. 27, 2018), https://patient.info/news-
and-features/sex-toys-health-benefits-for-women [https://perma.cc/37UD-EAW5].  
 7. See Vivian E. Hamilton, Principles of U.S. Family Law, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 31, 38 
(2006).  See generally Lawrence M. Friedman, A Dead Language:  Divorce Law and Practice 
Before No-Fault, 86 VA. L. REV. 1497 (2000). 
 8. See Peter Nicolas, Fundamental Rights in a Post-Obergefell World, 27 YALE J.L. & 
FEMINISM 331, 342 (2016). 
 9. See Julie Carr Smyth, Bestiality Crimes Targeted by New State Laws, FBI Reporting, 
SEATTLE TIMES (Apr. 1, 2017), https://www.seattletimes.com/nation-world/bestiality-crimes-
targeted-by-new-state-laws-fbi-reporting [https://perma.cc/6EJJ-ZL5Z] (noting the general 
criminal prohibition on bestiality). 
 10. See Eugene Volokh, Statutory Rape Laws and Age of Consent in the U.S., WASH. POST 
(May 1, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2015/05/ 
01/statutory-rape-laws-in-the-u-s [https://perma.cc/P9PU-M3U6] (surveying age of consent 
laws by state). 
 11. See Sheri Stritof, What Are the Cousin Marriage Laws in Your State?, THE SPRUCE 
(Jan. 1, 2019), https://www.thespruce.com/cousin-marriage-laws-listed-by-state-2300731 
[https://perma.cc/4D2G-UBVC] (finding that fourteen states outright ban marriage between 
close cousins, while most other states allow it only under certain circumstances). 
 12. See infra note 194 and accompanying text. 
 13. See, e.g., Curtis Waldo, Toys Are Us:  Sex Toys, Substantive Due Process, and the 
American Way, 18 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 807 (2011). 
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communicable diseases such as HIV, from practicing safe sex.14  However, 
the status of sex toy regulation, and morality as the sole justification for 
invading liberty, has been questioned by modern substantive due process 
cases arising from the privacy and LGBTQIA+ rights litigation of the 1980s 
through the 2010s.  Moreover, the unique barriers to intimacy that many sex 
toy users face provide a compelling argument that these devices are a 
necessary expression of liberty, privacy, autonomy, and self-definition that 
the government cannot invade, even under a rational basis test. 
While the U.S. Supreme Court has yet to weigh in on the constitutionality 
of regulating sex toys, there is a split on this topic between the Fifth and 
Eleventh Circuits.15  In Reliable Consultants, Inc. v. Earle,16 the Fifth Circuit 
held that, in light of Lawrence v. Texas,17 Texas had violated its citizens’ 
substantive due process rights to intimacy and sexual autonomy by 
prohibiting the sale of sex toys.18  Conversely, in Williams v. Attorney 
General,19 the Eleventh Circuit found that Alabama’s ban on the sale and 
marketing of sex toys was a permissible exercise of its police powers and 
inherent state sovereignty because neither Lawrence nor its predecessors or 
progeny ever created a general substantive due process right to sex or 
intimacy, let alone a specific right to use sex toys.  The Williams court—
instead of relying on Lawrence—relied on Washington v. Glucksberg,20 
finding that, for a right to be protected by substantive due process, it must be 
deeply rooted in the nation’s history and tradition, a narrower standard.21 
This Note examines the circuit split described above, the status of state 
regulation of sex toys more generally, and the broader ramifications for 
substantive due process methodology in anticipation of how the Supreme 
Court might rule.  Further, this Note examines the development of sexual 
 
 14. See HIV Prevention:  Low/No Risk Sexual Practices, AFAO, https://www. 
afao.org.au/about-hiv/hiv-prevention/low-no-risk-sexual-practices [https://perma.cc/4KTG-
NWQC] (last visited June 22, 2020). 
 15. Compare Reliable Consultants, Inc. v. Earle, 517 F.3d 738, 742–43 (5th Cir. 2008) 
(finding that Texas’s ban on sex toys violates the Due Process Clause), with Williams v. Att’y 
Gen., 378 F.3d 1232, 1250 (11th Cir. 2004) (finding Alabama’s prohibition on sex toy sales 
constitutional under the Due Process Clause). 
 16. 517 F.3d 738 (5th Cir. 2008) (holding state and local laws outlawing consensual, 
private, and intimate same-sex sexual contact unconstitutional under the Fourteenth 
Amendment). 
 17. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).  In Lawrence, the Court struck down a Texas statute that 
criminalized private sexual conduct between consenting LGBTQIA+ couples. Id. at 578.  
Importantly, the Court relied on the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to find 
that the Texas statute invaded a protected liberty interest, though the Court did not announce 
a substantive due process right to sex. See id. 
 18. See Reliable Consultants, Inc., 517 F.3d at 744. 
 19. 378 F.3d 1232 (11th Cir. 2004). 
 20. 521 U.S. 702 (1997).  In Glucksberg, the Court rejected the petitioner’s claim that the 
Due Process Clause encompasses a right to physician-assisted suicide. Id. at 727–28.  Of 
methodological significance, the Court found that the Fourteenth Amendment only protects 
fundamental rights that are “deeply rooted” in the nation’s history and tradition. See id. at 
720–21. 
 21. Williams, 378 F.3d at 1239. 
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rights—and the right to use sex toys—through the lens of Romer v. Evans,22 
Lawrence, and Obergefell v. Hodges.23  Specifically, this Note looks at the 
liberty interest asserted by users of sex toys and retailers who assert the rights 
of individuals, the due process right implicated by state regulation of sex 
toys, the broad scope of liberty promised by the Fourteenth Amendment, and 
the current methodology for substantive due process claims.24 
Part I.A of this Note explores how sex toys are defined under the law, 
details how they have been criminalized, and illuminates their practical 
necessity.  Part I.B outlines the historical background of the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s Due Process Clause and the development of the substantive 
due process doctrine.  Part I.C analyzes substantive due process 
methodology, looking at a number of tests that have been used over the past 
one hundred years.  Part I.D discusses the history of morals legislation25 and 
morality as a justification for restricting individual liberty, offering 
background on Supreme Court jurisprudence prior to Reliable Consultants, 
Inc. and Williams.  Part I.E explains how Obergefell, which the Court decided 
after Reliable Consultants, Inc. and Williams, altered morals jurisprudence 
and may cast the circuit split in a new light.26 
Part II discusses the split between the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits and the 
different ways in which these courts have applied substantive due process 
methodology.  The Fifth Circuit found that laws criminalizing sex toys 
burden the right to sexual privacy, which Lawrence classified as a protected 
liberty interest.27  Conversely, the Eleventh Circuit found that, because 
Lawrence neither explicitly recognized a fundamental right to sexual privacy 
nor outwardly rejected morality as a justification, the state law only needed 
to be rationally related to the state’s morality interest.28 
 
 22. 517 U.S. 620 (1996) (holding invalid under the Equal Protection Clause a provision 
of Colorado’s constitution that prohibited local communities from codifying protections for 
LGBTQIA+ individuals beyond those offered at the state level). 
 23. 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015) (finding that under the Due Process Clause—and supported by 
the Equal Protection Clause—there is a fundamental right to marriage that same-sex couples 
cannot be deprived of). 
 24. As this Note explains, the Court has approached substantive due process questions 
with different and oftentimes competing methodologies. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. 
Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992) (joint opinion of O’Connor, Kennedy, and Souter, JJ.) 
(discussing the importance of autonomy and self-determination to the liberty inquiry).  
Compare Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (finding that substantive due process is 
guided by history and tradition but informed by the Equal Protection Clause, societal changes, 
democratic consensus, and reasoned judgment), with Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (holding that 
any substantive due process right must be deeply rooted in the nation’s history and tradition 
to be considered “fundamental”).  But see Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 122–23 
(1989) (subscribing to the strict history and tradition test). 
 25. While many U.S. laws, including criminal laws, have roots in basic Western and 
Judeo-Christian notions of morality, this Note focuses on criminal laws targeting activities 
that, on their own, neither present a harm or coercion risk to any group nor are dangerous as 
used by an individual or consenting couples. 
 26. Obergefell was decided in 2015, and the Court’s application of equal protection 
analysis to the substantive due process question may be dispositive to the sex toy cases and to 
future substantive due process litigation. See infra Part I.E. 
 27. Reliable Consultants, Inc. v. Earle, 517 F.3d 738, 744 (5th Cir. 2008). 
 28. Williams v. Att’y Gen., 378 F.3d 1232, 1236 (11th Cir. 2004). 
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Part III examines what each of these two holdings would mean for broader 
substantive due process jurisprudence if adopted by the Supreme Court.  Part 
III.A examines what the Fifth Circuit’s interpretation of substantive due 
process methodology would mean for a broader right of sexual privacy.  Part 
III.B examines how the Eleventh Circuit’s deference to state police powers 
and use of history as a guidepost would suggest a narrower liberty interest 
and retain the state’s traditional role of regulating morals. 
Finally, Part IV suggests that, in light of Obergefell, Williams 
misidentified the liberty interest asserted and applied an overly narrow test 
for substantive due process.  Specifically, this Note argues that state 
regulation of sex toys is a paradigmatic government overreach into the 
personal liberties of its citizens.  From there, this Note concludes that the 
correct reading of Lawrence and Obergefell establishes that the proper 
analysis involves a heightened form of rational basis review for state action 
invading sexual autonomy, which can only be overcome by a showing of 
harm or coercion. 
I.  THE HISTORY OF SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS, SEX TOY REGULATION, 
AND STATE LAWS GROUNDED IN MORALITY 
Since its ratification, courts have interpreted the Fourteenth Amendment’s 
Due Process Clause to protect more than just fair procedure in the 
adjudication of claims.29  Indeed, the Fourteenth Amendment includes a 
substantive component, preventing the government from regulating certain 
aspects of life or activities that are deemed fundamental to the concept of 
liberty.30  At the same time, sex toys have also existed for hundreds of years 
and have played a role in the sexual expression of individuals and couples.31  
Part I.A discusses sex toys and their practical uses.  Part I.B provides 
background about substantive due process.  Part I.C then discusses the 
concept of morals as a justification for state policies restricting liberty.  
Finally, Part I.D introduces Obergefell, a significant case for the 
development of substantive due process that is possibly dispositive to the 
resolution of this circuit split. 
A.  The Practical Necessity of Sex Toys and the Statutes at Issue 
Sex toys are, in a legal sense, devices whose primary purpose is the 
stimulation of human sexual organs.32  This includes manual and electronic 
 
 29. See David E. Bernstein, The History of “Substantive” Due Process:  It’s Complicated, 
95 TEX. L. REV. SEE ALSO 1, 2–9 (2016) (identifying that substantive due process doctrine 
originated in the 1870s but recognizing that some scholars only date modern substantive due 
process doctrine back to the early twentieth century). 
 30. See id. at 2. 
 31. See Katie Heaney, The 30,000-Year History of the Sex Toy, THE CUT (Nov. 17, 2017), 
https://www.thecut.com/2017/11/the-30-000-year-history-of-the-sex-toy.html [https:// 
perma.cc/8ZAK-2T2B]. 
 32. See ALA. CODE § 13A-12-200.2 (2020) (defining a sex toy as a device for “the 
stimulation of human genital organs”); see also TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 43.21(a)(7) (West 
2020), invalidated by Reliable Consultants, Inc. v. Earle, 517 F.3d 738 (5th Cir. 2008). 
2020] DUE PROCESS AND SEXUAL LIBERTY 201 
devices that massage human genitals and prosthetic devices that simulate 
male and female sexual organs.33  Sex toys serve a number of goals and 
interests for both consenting adults in intimate relationships and individuals 
outside of relationships.34  First, sex toys enable intimacy for adults who are 
otherwise physically unable to replicate the devices’ effects.35  Second, in 
relationships where one partner is unable to perform sexually, sex toys allow 
the individual to provide sexual gratification to the other partner.36  Third, 
for those with communicable diseases such as HIV, sex toys allow for safe 
sex and preserve dignity in intimate relationships by facilitating safe sexual 
intercourse without the stigma or risk of transmitting disease.37  Fourth, sex 
toys are therapeutic for those suffering from certain sexual limitations, such 
as erectile dysfunction.38  Finally, sex toys allow asexual adults, individuals 
without sexual partners, and others who choose to abstain from sex for any 
reason to find intimate gratification.39 
Opposition to sex toys largely derives from taboos associated with their 
use and the view that they promote sexual promiscuity.40  Sex toys are not 
necessary for procreation, which leads many religious and socially 
conservative groups to oppose their use as part of a general opposition to 
sexual expression that is detached from procreation.41  In addition, the use of 
sex toys is particularly prevalent among two groups that have historically 
been politically disadvantaged:  people with communicable sexually 
transmitted diseases and LGBTQIA+ couples.42  Further, some states, 
including Alabama, contend that allowing the retail sale of sex toys is 
equivalent to selling sex, the regulation of which is a recognized valid interest 
of state governments.43  However, sex toys do not present the same societal 
risks that prostitution,44 underage sex,45 or polygamy46 do.  For one, they are 
 
 33. See Marissa Gainsburg et al., The 24 Best Sex Toys for Couples in 2020, WOMEN’S 
HEALTH MAG. (Oct. 17, 2019), https://www.womenshealthmag.com/sex-and-love/ 
g19984127/best-couples-sex-toys/ [https://perma.cc/F3BB-WSVA]. 
 34. Reliable Consultants, Inc., 517 F.3d at 742–43 (discussing the recognized uses of sex 
toys). 
 35. See Turner, supra note 6.  
 36. See Reliable Consultants, Inc., 517 F.3d at 742. 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. 
 39. See State v. Brenan, 772 So. 2d 64, 72–76 (La. 2000) (holding that Louisiana’s 
obscene device statute fails rational basis review). 
 40. See generally Danielle J. Lindemann, Pathology Full Circle:  A History of Anti-
vibrator Legislation in the United States, 15 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 326 (2006). 
 41. See GEOFFREY R. STONE, SEX AND THE CONSTITUTION 201–02 (2017) (discussing the 
severe penalties of the Comstock Act). 
 42. See Margo Kaplan, Sex-Positive Law, 89 N.Y.U. L. REV. 89, 153–59 (2014) 
(discussing the history of sex toy legislation and its aims). 
 43. See Brief of Appellant William H. Pryor Jr. at 16–17, Williams v. Att’y Gen., 378 
F.3d 1232 (11th Cir. 2004) (No. 02-16135-DD). 
 44. See Erotic Serv. Provider Legal Educ. & Rsch. Project v. Gascon, 880 F.3d 450, 456 
(9th Cir. 2018) (finding that substantive due process protects the choices of intimate couples 
in relationships and not sex per se, including prostitution). 
 45. See id. 
 46. Id. 
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not coercive and are designed for and marketed to consenting adults.  Further, 
by their design, they do not transmit diseases and are not a risk to public 
health.  Therefore, the use of sexual devices is fundamentally victimless, 
distinguishing it from other recognized government interests.47  Contrast this 
with other pleasure-inducing, yet possibly dangerous, devices such as 
electronic cigarettes, which present the government with a bona fide 
regulatory interest.48 
Proponents and opponents of sex toy use both analogize the devices to 
different sex-related products that have already been the subject of 
constitutional challenges.  For supporters, sex toys are like contraceptives in 
that, even though they are commercial in nature, they are part of the liberty 
right of married and unmarried persons to engage in sexual activities 
detached from procreation.  For detractors, sex toys are more akin to obscene 
materials, essentially constituting commercial sex that deserves no 
heightened constitutional status.49 
Alabama and Texas both established, under similar pretenses, criminal 
penalties for the sale and distribution of sex toys.50  This Note focuses on 
state laws that ban the sale or distribution of sex toys outright and impose 
criminal penalties for the activity of selling on a commercial scale. 
Chapter 12 of Alabama’s criminal code prohibits “Offenses Against Public 
Health and Morals.”51  This chapter includes the 1998 Anti-Obscenity 
Enforcement Act52 (“Alabama Obscenity Act”), which, in relevant part, 
makes it a crime for “any person to knowingly distribute, possess with intent 
to distribute, or offer or agree to distribute any obscene material or any device 
designed or marketed as useful primarily for the stimulation of human genital 
organs.”53  The law provides harsh penalties for violators who sell or 
distribute sex toys:  first-time offenders face up to a $10,000 fine and one 
year in jail or one year of hard labor, while repeat offenders face up to ten 
years in prison and, for corporations or business entities, $50,000 in fines.54 
 
 47. But see Sarah Sloat, America Has an Extremely Disturbing Sex Toy Problem, INVERSE 
(Sept. 14, 2017), https://www.inverse.com/article/30641-sex-toys-testing-regulations [https:// 
perma.cc/9LQZ-MWTP] (noting that sex toys can be dangerous if not produced or sold under 
sanitary conditions).  This Note does not assert that the state has no interest in regulating such 
devices but rather that criminalization or an outright ban represents an inappropriate 
overreach. 
 48. See Karen Zraick & Jacey Fortin, Is It Time to Quit Vaping?, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 22, 
2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/09/19/health/is-vaping-safe.html [https://perma.cc/ 
7F8U-UR3X]. 
 49. See Jess Joho, We’re in a Sex Toy Revolution.  Here’s How You Can Join, MASHABLE 
(Nov. 4, 2019), https://mashable.com/article/sex-toy-revolution-beginners-guide [https:// 
perma.cc/F6HK-TZ3U]. 
 50. See supra note 32. 
 51. ALA. CODE § 13A-12-200.2 (2020). 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. 
 54. A second violation of the Act is a Class C felony, id., which carries a sentence of “not 
more than 10 years or less than 1 year and 1 day.” Id. § 13A-5-6; see also Williams v. Att’y 
Gen., 378 F.3d 1232, 1233–34 (11th Cir. 2004). 
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The Alabama Obscenity Act was passed at an active moment for morals 
legislation, and challenges thereto, in the United States during the so-called 
“culture wars” of the 1980s and 1990s.55  Congress had passed the Defense 
of Marriage Act56 (DOMA) in 1996, which defined a marriage (for purposes 
of federal benefits) as a union between one man and one woman.57  DOMA, 
which was later ruled unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause,58 
had been primarily justified under two government interests:  (1) encouraging 
procreation and (2) “advanc[ing] the government’s interest in defending 
traditional notions of morality.”59  Indeed, the House of Representatives’s 
committee report accompanying DOMA said:  “This judgement entails both 
moral disapproval of homosexuality, and a moral conviction that 
heterosexuality better comports with traditional (especially Judeo-Christian) 
morality.”60 
The Alabama Obscenity Act’s drafters employed a similar justification.  
Efforts to pass the Act began with Alabama State Senator Tom Butler, whose 
primary interest was banning nude dancing.61  The inclusion of sex toys in 
the final bill, which did not originally mention the devices, was the result of 
a concerted lobbying effort.62  One of those lobbyists, Dan Ireland, former 
director of the Alabama Citizens Action Program, a conservative advocacy 
organization, suggested that sex toys were a greater public threat than 
firearms and articulated the urgency of regulating sex toys by proclaiming 
that while “there are moral ways and immoral ways to use a firearm . . . there 
is no moral way to use one of those devices.”63 
Passed in 1973, Texas Penal Code sections 43.21 and 43.22 criminalized 
the distribution, marketing, and advertising of obscene devices.64  The statute 
defined an obscene device as “a device including a dildo or artificial vagina, 
designed or marketed as useful primarily for the stimulation of human genital 
organs.”65  While the Texas statute was eventually overturned, it too had been 
enacted to assert a state conception of morality.66  The Texas attorney general 
 
 55. Jeffrey Aaron Snyder, America Will Never Move Beyond the Culture Wars, THE NEW 
REPUBLIC (Apr. 23, 2015), https://newrepublic.com/article/121627/war-soul-america-history-
culture-wars-review [https://perma.cc/XQ7K-GUFP]. 
 56. Pub. L. No. 104-199, 110 Stat. 2419 (1996), invalidated by United States v. Windsor, 
570 U.S. 744 (2013). 
 57. See 1 U.S.C. § 7, invalidated by United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744 (2013). 
 58. See Windsor, 570 U.S. at 769. 
 59. H.R. REP. NO. 104-664, at 15 (1996). 
 60. Id. at 15–16. 
 61. See Sex Toy Ban May Be Enforced in Alabama, UNITED PRESS INT’L (Oct. 2, 2007, 
12:05 PM), https://www.upi.com/Top_News/2007/10/02/Sex-toy-ban-may-be-enforced-in-
Alabama/90051191341143 [https://perma.cc/M8D8-XK4V]. 
 62. See Jacob M. Appel, Alabama’s Bad Vibrations, HUFFINGTON POST (Sept. 25, 2009), 
https://www.huffpost.com/entry/alabamas-bad-vibrations_b_300491 [https://perma.cc/ 
Q9NH-NVHY]. 
 63. Id. 
 64. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 43.21–43.22 (West 2020), invalidated by Reliable 
Consultants, Inc. v. Earle, 517 F.3d 738 (5th Cir. 2008). 
 65. Id. § 43.21. 
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noted that the law “is based on several police-power interests in protecting 
public morals—discouraging prurient interests in sexual gratification, 
combating the commercial sale of sex, and protecting minors.”67  However, 
these interests are not clearly served by the criminalization of sex toys, which 
inherently involve no coercive element. 
The statute was first challenged under the Fourteenth Amendment in a 
Texas state court in 1985.68  There, an individual was arrested, charged, and 
convicted of possession of an obscene device with intent to distribute.69  The 
defendant received a $750 fine and three days in jail.70  The court looked to 
the contraception and abortion cases of the 1960s and 1970s before finding 
that the statute did not violate any liberty interest under the Fourteenth 
Amendment or any similar provision of the Texas Constitution.71  First, the 
court interpreted the right of privacy, articulated in Roe v. Wade72 and 
Griswold v. Connecticut,73 as applicable strictly to decisions of procreation 
and child-rearing74 and held that the right protected “individual decisions in 
matters of childbearing from unjustified intrusion.”75  Finally, the court 
found that the rationale underlying the state’s exercise of police power—
order and morality—justified the state’s criminalization of sex toys.76  This 
justification fits within the traditional construction of the state’s police 
powers and the traditionalist conception of a limited judicial role in rights 
declaration. 
B.  The History of the Fourteenth Amendment and Substantive Due Process  
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides that no 
state shall “deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due 
process of law.”77  Since at least 1887, courts have found the word “liberty” 
to carry with it a substantive component that protects affirmative rights.78  
While substantive due process is one of the most controversial areas of 
constitutional law, with scholars differing on its exact meaning and history, 
the Supreme Court began to recognize certain unenumerated substantive 
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rights protected by the Due Process Clause beginning in the 1890s.79  In these 
early cases, heard into the beginning of the twentieth century, the Court 
recognized that the Due Process Clause protected certain natural rights—
including, most notably, freedom of contract.80  While the modern doctrine 
has changed, these early cases set the foundation for judges using the 
Fourteenth Amendment to elevate unenumerated substantive rights to 
constitutional status.  Importantly, judges have not given meaning to the 
notion of liberty contained in the Fourteenth Amendment merely because 
they feel they “owe” something to the constitutional text.81  Rather, judges 
bring broad notions of liberty to the text based on their own conceptions of 
rights, informed by social norms, history, the common law, and beliefs about 
personal autonomy from government overreach.82 
While relegated to the anticanon of constitutional law, Lochner v. New 
York83 is unquestionably the building block of modern substantive due 
process.84  The distinctive feature of Lochner’s essential holding—that New 
York could not impose certain wage and hour labor regulations because of a 
fundamental right to freedom of contract85—was that the Court focused on 
the liberty interest presented by the party bringing a claim against an 
allegedly intrusive government act.86  That basic methodology remains a 
cornerstone of substantive due process cases.  However, Lochner’s oft-
criticized jurisprudential policy move was to exclusively find economic 
liberty interests, such as contract and property, with no regard for 
constitutional text or history.87  To many, and notably Justice Oliver Wendall 
Holmes Jr. in his dissent, Lochner represented an activist Court reading an 
economic philosophy into the Constitution without any textual or historical 
support.88  Just as Lochner’s basic weighing of the government’s interest in 
regulation against the liberty interest endures in today’s substantive due 
process doctrine, so too do Holmes’s criticisms of judicial policymaking.  In 
other words, throughout the history of substantive due process, there is a 
familiar dichotomy between deploying a balancing test to announce new 
rights or refraining from such drastic action unless there is clear textual and 
historical support. 
However, while the Court began to move away from, and would eventually 
abandon, a fundamental right to contract, it also began retooling the doctrine 
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to focus on the rights of individuals and their privacy against government 
overreach.  In Meyer v. Nebraska,89 the Court held that the Due Process 
Clause protects not just economic rights but the rights “to acquire useful 
knowledge, to marry, establish a home and bring up children, to worship God 
according to the dictates of [one’s] own conscience, and generally to enjoy 
those privileges long recognized at common law as essential to the orderly 
pursuit of happiness by free men.”90  Meyer, which concerned a challenge to 
a Nebraska law that restricted foreign language education, introduced another 
component essential to modern substantive due process doctrine:  it found 
that even though ensuring English proficiency was a laudable policy goal, 
the means used to accomplish that end were unconstitutional because of the 
liberty interest at stake.91  In other words, the Court expanded the doctrine to 
scrutinize the policy tools used by states to accomplish facially constitutional 
ends when the legislation in question involved a protected liberty interest.  
This move, while decried as an infringement on state sovereignty and 
federalism,92 is important for plaintiffs seeking to assert a liberty interest 
against the government because it allows the court to move beyond the facial 
text of a policy to examine the motivation of the policy makers.93 
While the Court repudiated the doctrine in the New Deal era and 
substantive due process was absent from the Court’s constitutional decisions 
for some time, the doctrine returned for good in 1965.94  In Griswold, the 
Court found an unenumerated right to privacy via the Due Process Clause.95  
While Justice William O. Douglas, writing for the majority, claimed that he 
had merely identified this right within the “penumbras” of the Bill of Rights 
and had not created a new substantive right altogether, modern scholars agree 
in near unanimity that Griswold is a substantive due process case.96 
Over the next several decades, the Court began to recognize other 
protected liberty interests, including abortion97 and interracial marriage.98  In 
these early cases, the Court followed a strict formula:  it would either find a 
right fundamental and would subject it to strict scrutiny, or it would find that 
a right was not fundamental and would apply a highly deferential rational 
basis test.99  However, this test is far from the only one the Court has used, 
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and, accordingly, the Court has struggled to articulate a bright-line rule for 
the circuits.100 
Several elements of Lochner and the early substantive due process cases 
have vanished, probably for good.  For one, the Court no longer recognizes 
economic rights as fundamental, though there has been a Lochner-revision 
movement.101  For another, in an effort to bolster the Court’s legitimacy and 
demonstrate judicial restraint, the modern Court has trended towards 
grounding substantive due process decisions with a textual hook, although it 
has continued to depart from the methodology on some major cases, 
including Obergefell.102  However, the pre–New Deal Court and the modern 
Court still present a similar dichotomy:  on the one hand, the Court seems to 
be elevating certain classes of rights by deploying a balancing test and, for 
the rest of the asserted liberty interests, using a formalistic approach.103  
Finally, this test, when tied to history and tradition, attempts to be objective 
but can become unbound from objectivity when new rights are elevated 
without any textual hook or historical significance. 
C.  Substantive Due Process Methodology 
The Court has deployed a number of tests when evaluating substantive due 
process claims and has utilized different methodologies to determine whether 
a fundamental right or protected liberty interest exists.  In exploring these 
methodologies, this section first looks at Roe v. Wade and its progeny as the 
building blocks of the modern personal liberties cases.  Next, it briefly 
discusses conservative pushback on Roe, specifically against its purported 
lack of constitutional grounding for elevating unenumerated rights, and the 
implications for the democratic process and the Court’s legitimacy.  From 
there, this section introduces the fact that there are now two distinct forms of 
substantive due process.  For decisions implicating sexual autonomy and 
privacy, the Court uses a harms test while applying an advanced form of 
rational basis, also known as rational basis with bite.  At the same time, the 
Court has embraced a test that frames the right narrowly and only vindicates 
it if the liberty interest is supported by history and tradition.104  This section 
describes the importance of how the Court frames the right at issue and the 
different considerations and factors the Court weighs, including the asserted 
state interest relative to the states’ powers. 
Finally, this section discusses the particulars of Justice Anthony 
Kennedy’s approach to substantive due process in the LGBTQIA+ rights 
cases and what it means for state regulations and legislation predicated on 
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bare morals.  This section discusses how the Court dealt with the asserted 
state interest and what, if at all, it means to the future of the doctrine. 
One of the substantive due process doctrine’s defining and controversial 
characteristics, which has significant implications for the regulation of sex 
toys, is the confusing and inconsistent way the Court has applied it.  This 
section tracks the development of the methodology and identifies the 
different jurisprudential policy concerns that judges look to when presented 
with a liberty claim. 
By the time the Supreme Court heard Roe, the Court had clearly repudiated 
Lochner and lived in fear of returning to its approach to substantive due 
process.105  At the same time, the Court sought a way to insulate 
unenumerated substantive rights from government overreach.106  However, 
the doctrine was complicated and unclear. 
Griswold set the groundwork for finding substantive rights to privacy and 
intimacy.107  In Griswold, the Court considered Connecticut’s criminal 
prohibition on contraceptives.108  The Court defined the liberty interest in 
Griswold as the “intimate relation of husband and wife and their physician’s 
role in one aspect of that relation.”109  Although the Court decided the case 
using the so-called “penumbral analysis,” which vindicated liberty rights 
based on their relationship to the Bill of Rights, Griswold embraced the 
process of finding constitutionally protected liberty interests using the 
Fourteenth Amendment.110  Two other aspects of the Griswold holding are 
significant:  First, physicians and birth control providers had standing to 
assert the liberty interests of individual users of the products.111  Second, the 
recognized right to marry carried with it other liberty interests, such as 
privacy and intimacy, detached from procreation.112  The clearest articulation 
of substantive due process methodology came in a concurrence by Justice 
John Marshall Harlan.  Building on his dissent in Palko v. Connecticut,113 
Justice Harlan contended that incorporation did not limit the Due Process 
Clause to the penumbras of the Bill of Rights and that the question posed 
must be whether the right asserted is one “implicit in the concept of ordered 
liberty.”114  While this is the most famous line of Harlan’s concurrence, he 
also responded to Justices Hugo Black and Potter Stewart, who felt that the 
penumbral analysis provided the judicial restraint so lacking in the Lochner 
era.115  To them he said: 
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Judicial self-restraint will not, I suggest, be brought about in the “due 
process area” by the historically unfounded incorporation formula long 
advanced by my Brother[s] . . . .  It will be achieved in this area, as in other 
constitutional areas, only by continual insistence upon respect for the 
teaching of history, solid recognition of the basic values that underlie our 
society, and wise appreciation of the great roles that the doctrines of 
federalism and separation of powers have played in preserving American 
freedoms.116 
Justice Harlan’s words have proven to be immensely influential for the 
Court, regardless of ideology.  For those who have taken an expansive view 
of substantive due process, Justice Harlan’s broad conceptions of liberty 
touch Roe and were explicitly at work years later117 when the Court sustained 
the abortion right in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. 
Casey.118  For those who take a narrower view of substantive due process, 
history and tradition are the starting and ending points for finding a 
substantive due process right, and principles of federalism are crucial to 
democratic order.119  Further, even though the majority opinion is grounded 
in the penumbral analysis, the Court states that the privacy described in 
Griswold is promised by the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process 
Clause.120 
After Griswold, Justice Harry Blackmun expanded the substantive due 
process doctrine with his majority opinion in Roe, in which he clarified that 
the pertinent privacy interest—the right to an abortion—encompassed more 
than just the right to be left alone.121  Justice Blackmun said the right of 
privacy under the Fourteenth Amendment was about the right to be free from 
government influence when making life-changing moral decisions.122  The 
private place Roe protected was not the bedroom or the home but the moral 
sphere where one has a right to make choices and act out those choices 
without state interference.123 
Roe’s implications, doctrinally and politically, were far-reaching at the 
time, and U.S. political culture continues to battle over the result.124  While 
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it signaled the Court’s openness to a doctrine of liberty that vindicated 
individual rights in the public and private spheres, it also spawned a fierce 
political movement that engendered pushback from a number of judges and 
commentators.125  Indeed, as conservative judges skeptical of the doctrine 
joined the Court, they sought a method to retool the doctrine to promote 
judicial self-restraint.126 
In 1986, thirteen years after Roe, Bowers v. Hardwick127 considered the 
constitutionality of a Georgia statute that outlawed “sodomy,” defined as oral 
or anal sex between consenting adults.128  The opinion, penned by Justice 
Byron White, backed away from Roe’s broad conceptions of autonomy when 
framing the liberty interest.129  Instead, the Court framed the legal question 
as whether the Constitution confers “a fundamental right upon homosexuals 
to engage in sodomy.”130  To answer that question, explained Justice White, 
the petitioner must show “that a right to engage in such conduct is ‘deeply 
rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition’ or ‘implicit in the concept of 
ordered liberty.’”131 
For the Justices who take a strict view of substantive due process, these 
two methodological moves are absolute necessities.  For one, by narrowly 
tailoring the right, the Court limited its risk of ushering in dramatic social 
change.  The consequences of judicially crafted social change have long been 
a chief concern of substantive due process critics.  For example, in Roe, 
Justice William Rehnquist cautioned that the advent of judge-made policy 
would delegitimize the Court.132  Former D.C. Court of Appeals judge and 
unsuccessful Supreme Court nominee Robert Bork made a similar point in 
his book The Tempting of America.133  In a related vein, Chief Justice Roberts 
argued that by framing the liberty interest broadly in Obergefell, the Court 
was unjustly taking the gay marriage question out of the democratic 
process.134  To Chief Justice Roberts, framing the liberty interest at its most 
granular level is the only way the Court can preserve its role deciding cases 
and controversies without stepping into the role of state legislatures.135  
Second, while Chief Justice Roberts’s opinion focused on political process, 
Justice Alito’s dissent demonstrates that by demanding that the narrowly 
tailored right be supported by history and tradition, the Court can attempt to 
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align the asserted liberty with an originalist understanding of the 
Constitution.136 
Finally, following Roe, the Court found another occasion to consider this 
controversial and expansive methodology.137  In Casey, the Court considered 
a challenge to a Pennsylvania statute that placed a number of restrictions on 
the ability of women to obtain an abortion, such as requiring spousal 
notification and a mandatory twenty-four-hour waiting period.138  While 
reaffirming the central holding of Roe, the Court embraced its expansive 
methodology.139  The joint opinion by Justices Kennedy, O’Connor, and 
Souter rejected the strict history and tradition test deployed in Bowers and 
instead boiled the judge’s role in a substantive due process case down to a 
single broad standard:  reasoned judgment.140  Further, the plurality also 
explained that the liberty interest at stake in the case was not the specific 
activity of abortion but the right to make personal choices crucial to defining 
one’s own identity free from government intrusion.141  Connecting the issue 
to abortion, the Court explained that what Roe sought to protect—and what 
Casey was upholding—was a woman’s fundamental liberty to make 
decisions about her reproductive activity.142  What is more, for liberty 
interests so central to the conception of self, there is no procedure—however 
fair—that the state may use to deprive an individual of that liberty.143 
Today, the Supreme Court has simultaneously recognized two competing 
methodologies for finding a liberty interest in the Fourteenth Amendment.  
The conservative methodology is most clearly articulated, and was officially 
adopted for substantive due process cases, in Glucksberg.144  There, the 
Court deployed a similar methodology to the one used in Bowers and held 
that the Court would find a substantive due process right and apply strict 
scrutiny only if the right was deeply rooted in the nation’s history and 
tradition and carefully described.145  In Glucksberg, the Court considered 
whether individuals had a fundamental right to end their own lives.146  
Answering the history question, the Court looked to centuries of “self-
murder” law in the United States and other western democracies.147  The 
Court traced the historical treatment of suicide and assisted suicide through 
common and statutory law and concluded that there was a deep-rooted 
tradition of its criminalization.148  Further, the Court examined current state 
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laws related to assisted suicide to demonstrate the robust public debate on the 
topic and illustrate that the democratic process was at work to resolve it.149  
Framing the legal question, the Court went to the most granular level, saying 
that the “careful description” in this case was whether “the protections of the 
Due Process Clause include a right to commit suicide.”150 
This description, while accurate, is far from the totality of the liberty 
interest actually at stake.  For instance, the Court could have asked about end-
of-life decisions, the rights of the terminally ill, and so forth.151  Finally, in 
addition to narrowly tailoring the right and looking to history and legal 
traditions, the Court also looked to democratic alternatives for answering the 
question.152  In her concurrence, Justice Sandra Day O’Connor wrote:  
“There is no reason to think the democratic process will not strike the proper 
balance between the interests of terminally ill, mentally competent 
individuals who would seek to end their suffering, and the State’s interests in 
protecting those who might seek to end life mistakenly or under pressure.”153 
The Glucksberg methodology held itself out to be a final articulation of 
the Court’s substantive due process methodology.  For its supporters, it 
finally provided a bright-line rule that would defer most issues to the political 
branches and provide judicial restraint.154  For its detractors, however, it 
trivialized the right at stake and was circular in its reasoning.155  For example, 
by requiring that the liberty interest be one that is deeply rooted, the Court 
was signaling that it would only protect long-standing interests, leaving 
modern invasions of liberty unprotected. 
At the same time that Glucksberg stood as one formulation of the Court’s 
substantive due process methodology, a separate doctrine began to emerge 
for sexual liberties cases.  In 1996, the Court revisited LGBTQIA+ rights 
issues for the first time since Bowers in Romer v. Evans.156  The case 
concerned a Colorado state constitutional amendment that prohibited 
municipalities from passing antidiscrimination statutes for gay men and 
lesbians beyond what the state already provided.157  Writing for the majority, 
Justice Kennedy found that the provision violated the Equal Protection 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because it showed “animus” to a 
politically unpopular group.158  Further, while the Court did not hold that gay 
people are a protected class and subject to strict scrutiny, the Court found that 
the law failed rational basis scrutiny.159  Significantly, this was a form of 
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rational basis that was unrecognizable when compared to the highly 
deferential review applied in most cases.160  While rational basis review is 
traditionally highly deferential, this version was searching, looking into 
pretext. 
While not a substantive due process case, Romer is important to sexual 
liberty jurisprudence because it attacks the idea of morality as an independent 
justification for legislation aimed at a politically unpopular group and 
suggests that rational basis in this context is a less deferential standard than 
it is in other contexts.  By finding that the Colorado state constitutional 
amendment failed even rational basis review, the Court was elevating not 
only minority groups but also the type of liberty the government was trying 
to restrict—autonomy and independence from government overreach. 
Lawrence signaled a significant change in substantive due process 
methodology for sexual liberties cases.  In Lawrence, the Court considered a 
Texas state sodomy law similar to the one previously found constitutional in 
Bowers.  Lawrence is significant in its methodological approach and its 
practical implications for groups targeted by morals legislation, such as those 
who use sex toys, and the extent to which the government may regulate these 
groups’ liberty.  Justice Kennedy’s opinion clarified that due process 
concerns are implicated by any regulation of “the most private human 
conduct, sexual behavior,”161 in “the most private of places, the home.”162 
Overruling Bowers, Kennedy began with the historical analysis that 
animates Glucksberg but found that, for cases implicating intimacy, the 
historical analysis is the starting point but not “the ending point of the 
substantive due process inquiry.”163  Justice Kennedy also indicated that in 
intimacy cases, framing the right narrowly is also inappropriate, writing:  “To 
say that the issue in Bowers was simply the right to engage in certain sexual 
conduct demeans the claim the individual put forward, just as it would 
demean a married couple were it to be said marriage is simply about the right 
to have sexual intercourse.”164  In looking beyond the mere sexual interest 
involved, the Court said that “[w]hen sexuality finds overt expression in 
intimate conduct with another person, the conduct can be but one element in 
a personal bond that is more enduring.  The liberty protected by the 
Constitution allows homosexual persons the right to make this choice.”165 
Finally, the Court made another important move, confirming that the type 
of intimacy and sexuality protected by the Fourteenth Amendment goes 
beyond decisions implicating child-rearing, finding that personal decisions 
“concerning the intimacies of . . . physical relationship[s], even when not 
intended to produce offspring, are a form of liberty protected by the Due 
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Process Clause.”166  The Court also cited a long line of substantive due 
process cases, including Griswold, for the proposition that there is something 
different about the sphere of liberty implicated by state action regulating 
sexuality.167 
Interestingly, while overturning Bowers and finding that the states’ interest 
in regulating morality was insufficient to justify the intrusive regulation, the 
court did not elevate sex, intimacy, sexual orientation, or sexual autonomy to 
fundamental right status.168  Instead, the Court found that the Texas statute 
failed some form of rational basis review that it did not define.169  However, 
the Court did mention that the right implicated in Lawrence did not impact 
minors, cause injury or coercion, or involve any conduct spilling into the 
public forum, suggesting that these factors would implicate valid government 
interests.170  Thus, the Court may have been implying that for regulation of 
sexual autonomy, the test is harm.171  If a state is able to demonstrate that the 
activity causes a cognizable harm, then the activity may be regulated.172  On 
the other hand, if the activity is purely personal and consensual, it would fail 
this version of rational basis review.173 
D.  Morals Legislation 
Since the nation’s founding, the government has used morality to justify 
legislation and regulation.  In the early colonial period, blasphemy, 
homosexuality, rejecting Christianity, and disobeying one’s parents were 
offenses punishable by death.174  In early U.S. history, legal proscriptions 
based on common conceptions of morality were common, even essential, 
elements of local government.175  However, public morality was defined by 
a local, rather than national, consensus and, thus, the intrusiveness of 
legislation varied greatly by state.176  Prior to the ratification of the 
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Fourteenth Amendment, the states’ police powers were at their apex, as the 
federal government was largely unable to influence state law.177 
Since the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment and the expansion of 
the Commerce Clause, the federal government has had a much larger role in 
shaping the landscape of state laws.  This includes the power of the federal 
courts to scrutinize state laws for compliance with the Fourteenth 
Amendment.178 
In modern terms, morals legislation can be generally defined as a law or 
regulation that prohibits or encourages certain conduct or associations based 
on a normative belief about how individuals should live their lives.179  
However, morals legislation is circumscribed by, among other things, the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause, the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s Due Process Clause, and the First Amendment’s 
Establishment Clause,180 which mandate that all laws must serve a primarily 
secular purpose.181  Further, as the Court has grappled with public morals 
legislation, it has struggled to articulate a specific test for determining which 
issues are legitimate state interests.  On the one hand, laws that burden First 
Amendment expression, freedom of contract, and personal liberty may 
nevertheless further a recognized state interest when they aim to protect 
minors182 or other parties vulnerable to coercion.  Along these lines, laws 
banning sex in public have been upheld as furthering a valid government 
interest.183 
For instance, in Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton,184 the Court said that it 
“implicitly accepted that a legislature could legitimately act on” the state’s 
belief that pornography is connected to antisocial behavior “to protect the 
social interest in order and morality.”185  Further, as Justice Antonin Scalia 
noted in Lawrence, because morality is viewed by some on the Court as the 
paradigmatic expression of the values and will of the people through their 
elected representatives, the Court should be hesitant to wade into the policy 
tools used by the legislature to effectuate that goal.186  Additionally, citizens 
who view public morals legislation as government overreach have the 
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opportunity to elect new leaders at the state and federal levels every several 
years, thus providing a further check on such legislation.187 
On the other hand, the Court has met public morals legislation with 
mounting skepticism and has been increasingly amenable to evaluating 
legislatures’ motivations and the effects of laws on politically unpopular 
groups.188  Further, as far back as 1969, the Court found that the “poisoning” 
of the minds of individuals who watch or consume obscene material in the 
privacy of their own homes is an insufficient morality interest.189  In the 
Fourteenth Amendment context, the Court has looked to legislative history 
and the effects on certain classes and has struck down laws borne of animus 
toward a certain class under rational basis review.190  In U.S. Department of 
Agriculture v. Moreno,191 the Court considered the constitutionality of the 
Department of Agriculture’s food stamp regulations, which denied benefits 
to otherwise eligible persons living with at least one unrelated person, finding 
the exclusion unconstitutional.192  While setting limits and regulations for the 
administration of a social welfare program is well within Congress’s 
purview, the Court struck down the law under rational basis review because 
the Act’s legislative history demonstrated that it was intended to prevent 
“hippies” from accessing the program.193  In finding that the Act violated the 
Equal Protection Clause of the Fifth Amendment,194 the Court ruled that 
morality borne of animus toward a politically unpopular group is not a 
constitutional exercise of power.195 
Finally, in United States v. Windsor,196 the Court further explained the 
limits of morals legislation and, specifically, laws that burden intimate 
choices.  The Windsor Court found that the federal definition of marriage as 
a marriage between one man and one woman, as codified by DOMA, violated 
the Fifth Amendment.197  Importantly, the Court found that while DOMA 
did not interfere with a gay couple’s sexual intimacy, the provision excluding 
their relationships from the definition of marriage “demean[ed] the couple[s], 
whose moral and sexual choices the constitution protects.”198  Thus, Windsor 
suggests that laws limiting the moral choices of citizens may be incompatible 
with the liberty promised by the Fourteenth Amendment. 
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E.  Obergefell v. Hodges 
After both the Fifth Circuit, in Reliable Consultants, Inc., and the Eleventh 
Circuit, in Williams, took different views on sex toy regulations, the 
Obergefell Court legalized same-sex marriage federally.  In Obergefell, 
decided twelve years after Lawrence, the Court expanded on its methodology 
for personal intimacy cases.199  Obergefell concerned a number of lawsuits 
filed in states that prohibited or failed to recognize same-sex marriage.200  
Generally speaking, a majority of the states that prohibited same-sex 
marriage did so on a few related morality-based grounds:  (1) that states 
should protect traditional definitions of marriage as a moral institution; (2) 
that states have a legitimate interest in promoting procreation; and (3) that 
allowing same-sex marriage would be a slippery slope to permitting more 
immoral activity, such as polygamy and bestiality.201 
From the start, Justice Kennedy framed the right at issue broadly, looking 
to the rights of all persons, regardless of sexual orientation, to define 
themselves and set the parameters of their relationships.202  Clearly, personal 
autonomy is a key feature of Justice Kennedy’s substantive due process 
decisions.203  Further, he described the importance of the institution of 
marriage as an independent liberty interest, as well as the implication 
marriage has on other interests, such as child-rearing, self-empowerment, 
self-expression, and the institution of the family.204  Importantly, Justice 
Kennedy also built on Lawrence to articulate the heightened importance of 
individual autonomy cases and the broader methodology they require.205  
Responding to claims that the Court should follow Glucksberg, framing the 
right at issue narrowly and exclusively relying on history and tradition, he 
wrote that “while that approach may have been appropriate for the asserted 
right there involved . . . , it is inconsistent with the approach this Court has 
used in discussing other fundamental rights, including marriage and 
intimacy.”206  Further, “[i]f rights were defined by who exercised them in the 
past, then received practices could serve as their own continued justification 
and new groups could not invoke rights once denied.”207  Significantly, this 
signaled that the Court might alter and expand its analysis if an asserted 
liberty interest is grounded in intimacy and that Glucksberg was not the 
Court’s final articulation of substantive due process methodology. 
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While the Obergefell opinion is rife with lofty language and broad 
propositions,208 Justice Kennedy introduces new elements into his 
methodology, building on Romer, Lawrence, and Windsor.  For one, 
Kennedy still relied on history as a starting point, looking to the broadening 
conceptions of marriage between men and women as well as the rights of gay 
people generally.209  For another, he looked to consensus, both in the United 
States and in other western democracies, on what marriage means.210  
Interestingly, he reframed the consensus point, looking not merely to 
legislative intent but also to studies, scientific consensus, and perceived 
social attitudes.211  In other words, Justice Kennedy did not restrict his 
analysis to the existing legal definitions of marriage in the United States and 
around the world; he also considered how science and culture were beginning 
to define the concept.212  Finally, he looked to the relationship between due 
process and equal protection, inferring that a right is more easily understood 
as fundamental if burdening that right based on a suspect classification—or 
one that has been treated with intermediate or heightened scrutiny—would 
offend equal protection.213 
Justice Kennedy also expanded on morality as a justification for state 
restrictions on sexual liberty.  Although Justice Kennedy did not make the 
same explicit reference to morality in Obergefell that he did in Lawrence, his 
discussion of the evolution of societal standards and mores, and how their 
progression shifts constitutional understandings, implies that traditional 
conceptions of morality may not continue to serve as a rational basis for 
legislation.214  Further, by clarifying that the Due Process Clause protects a 
right to marriage and intimacy that is “fundamental”215 and that the right of 
marriage and intimacy is closely related to other fundamental rights such as 
child-rearing and education, the Obergefell opinion challenged many of the 
traditional areas involving morals legislation.216  Finally, while Justice Scalia 
ominously warned that Lawrence marked “the end of all morals 
legislation,”217 Obergefell did not plunge a knife into the wound of morals 
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legislation as Scalia predicted.  It did, however, question many of the grounds 
and assumptions on which morals legislation rests. 
II.  THE CIRCUIT SPLIT ON RIGHTS AND METHODOLOGY 
Two circuits have ruled, with differing results, on whether the protection 
afforded by the Fourteenth Amendment extends to the possession or sale of 
sex toys.  In Reliable Consultants, Inc., the Fifth Circuit found that a Texas 
law banning the sale of sex toys violated the Fourteenth Amendment on 
substantive due process grounds.  Four years earlier, in Williams, the 
Eleventh Circuit ruled that criminalizing the possession of sex toys does not 
infringe any fundamental right related to privacy or sexual autonomy and, 
therefore, that state regulations banning their sale are subject only to an 
exceedingly deferential rational basis review, which the court found Alabama 
had met.218  This split of authority is due, in large part, to the shifting 
methodologies for framing substantive due process rights and divergent 
opinions as to which previous substantive due process cases are applicable 
precedent.  Importantly, both cases were decided after Lawrence but before 
Obergefell.219  Thus, the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits looked to drastically 
different methodologies—both recognized by the Supreme Court—to define 
the liberty interest at stake and the test used to evaluate government 
regulations. 
Part II.A of this Note discusses Reliable Consultants, Inc. and examines 
the role Lawrence played in shaping the court’s conception of liberty and 
permissible government regulations of sexuality and autonomy.  Part II.B 
discusses Williams and examines how the court minimized the methodology 
used in Lawrence in favor of the test articulated in Glucksberg. 
A.  Reliable Consultants, Inc. v. Earle 
In Reliable Consultants, Inc., the plaintiff, a Texas boutique that sold a 
number of intimate devices, sought to invalidate a Texas state statutory 
provision prohibiting the sale and advertising of sexual devices.220  The 
obscenity statute at issue was enacted in 1973 with the goal of keeping 
“obscene materials” from reaching the marketplace.221  As it pertains to sex 
toys, the statute criminalized the sale or advertising of any device “designed 
or marketed as useful primarily for the stimulation of human genital 
organs.”222  While the plaintiffs223 contended that the Texas statute violated 
a broad liberty interest in privacy and intimacy, Texas argued that the 
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regulation was rationally related to its interest in “discouraging prurient 
interests in autonomous sex . . . and prohibiting the commercial sale of 
sex.”224 
As in any substantive due process case, the Fifth Circuit was tasked with 
identifying the liberty interest and then applying the appropriate 
constitutional test to the state’s regulation of that interest.  First, the court 
engaged extensively with the practical uses and necessities of sex toys.225  
The court recognized a variety of reasons for the use of sex toys, including 
to meet therapeutic needs, assert personal desires, and avoid premarital 
intercourse.226  The court also addressed Texas’s argument that the plaintiff, 
as a distributor, did not have standing to assert the rights of individual sex 
toy users.227  Answering that question, the court analogized sex toys to 
contraception, as in Griswold, which held that restricting commercial 
transactions unconstitutionally infringes on an individual’s right.228 
In its brief, Texas offered a narrow reading of the liberty interest at issue 
in Reliable Consultants, Inc., defining it as the “right to stimulate one’s 
genitals for non-medical purposes unrelated to procreation or outside of an 
interpersonal relationship.”229  However, the Fifth Circuit defined the liberty 
interest broadly as “the individual right under the Fourteenth Amendment to 
engage in private intimate conduct in the home without government 
intrusion.”230 
The court framed this right using its reading of Lawrence.231  It engaged 
with Lawrence’s reasoning, concluding that the right Lawrence recognized 
was not the sexual act itself but the right to be free from government intrusion 
when making intimate decisions.232  Further, the Fifth Circuit also took cues 
from Lawrence’s dismissal of Bowers.233  The court found that in Lawrence, 
the Supreme Court recognized that in cases such as these, where sexual 
liberty is asserted as a right, defining the liberty interest as the specific act 
itself would trivialize the right.234  Thus, the Reliable Consultants, Inc. court 
did not narrowly tailor the right to the specific use of sex toys but asked if 
penalizing the use of sex toys violated the recognized liberty right to make 
private decisions about consensual intimacy in the home.235  Specifically, the 
Fifth Circuit read Lawrence as concluding that the sodomy law at issue 
violated the Fourteenth Amendment not because of a specific fundamental 
right to engage in sodomy but because the sodomy law more broadly violated 
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the substantive due process right to engage in consensual intimate conduct in 
the home free from government intrusion.236  Thus, according to the Reliable 
Consultants, Inc. court, Lawrence instructed that the relevant question to ask 
was not whether the right to sex toys is deeply rooted in our nation’s history 
and tradition but rather whether Texas’s law criminalizing the sale of sex toys 
burdened the recognized constitutional right to make intimate decisions in 
the home unencumbered by government interference. 
Next, the court had to grapple with which level of scrutiny applied to the 
Texas law.  As previously mentioned, one of the mysteries of Lawrence is 
that it did not categorize the right to sexual privacy or intimacy as a 
fundamental right.237  Following Lawrence, the Fifth Circuit did not find a 
fundamental right to sexual privacy or to sex toys.238  Likewise, it did not 
employ typical rational basis review.239  Instead, the Fifth Circuit looked at 
the governmental interests found constitutionally insufficient in Lawrence 
and applied them to sex toys.240 
In both Lawrence and Reliable Consultants, Inc., the states’ arguments 
were morality-based:  the statutes in question represented the moral 
judgments of the legislatures.  Therefore, the Fifth Circuit held that if 
morality was an insufficient justification for restricting consensual sodomy, 
then “public morality also cannot serve as a rational basis for Texas’s statute, 
which also regulates private sexual intimacy.”241 
Therefore, the Fifth Circuit’s methodology in Reliable Consultants, Inc. 
was twofold.  First, instead of analyzing whether the liberty interest in 
question infringed upon a fundamental right, the court looked to whether the 
individual liberty interest asserted—there, the implication of sex toys on 
sexual liberty—burdened the constitutionally protected realm of private 
decision-making.242  This departed from the Glucksberg framework, which 
asked whether the specific liberty interest—detached from others—was 
worthy of protection on its own.243  The second step was to examine the 
burden that the statute placed on that right, accepting that morality alone is 
an insufficient state justification.244 
B.  Williams v. Attorney General 
In Williams, the Eleventh Circuit addressed a similar, but narrower, statute.  
The Alabama Obscenity Act, which is still in effect, “prohibits . . . the 
commercial distribution of ‘any device designed or marketed as useful 
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primarily for the stimulation of human genital organs.’”245  But, the law does 
not prohibit mere possession or gifting of sex toys, and it allows the sale of 
certain devices that may be used as sex toys, so long as they are not primarily 
marketed or designed for that use.246  Finally, the law provides a safe harbor 
for using sex toys when there is a genuine medical necessity.247 
Plaintiffs’ counsel, the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), on behalf 
of a number of sex toy vendors seeking to operate in Alabama, urged an 
expansive reading of the right to use sex toys within a broad right to private 
sexual conduct.248  Further, the ACLU argued that Lawrence’s rejection of 
public morality as a justification for laws criminalizing consensual sodomy 
implies that public morality is likewise an insufficient justification for 
criminalizing sex toys.249  Additionally, the ACLU contended that the 
Alabama statute burdened a substantive due process right to private sexual 
intimacy because it restricted decisions between consenting adults in their 
private relationships.250 
Alabama, in contrast, took a different view.  First, the state argued that 
Lawrence did not recognize a new fundamental right but rather rejected 
public morals as a justification for laws that burden both private and 
noncommercial sexual choices,251 meaning that the sphere of privacy 
Lawrence protected was limited to those decisions made between consenting 
couples that implicate nothing beyond the four corners of their bedroom.  
Further, Alabama professed that reading Lawrence to foreclose justifying 
legislation with public morality would be a “radical” departure from legal 
and social norms, because all laws, including homicide, are based on a “social 
conceptions of ‘right’ and ‘wrong.’”252  Finally, Alabama warned that 
bestiality and necrophilia would quickly be legalized because they, too, are 
private and sexual acts.253 
The Eleventh Circuit considered the liberty interest at stake and the 
ACLU’s contention that Lawrence created a broad right to sexual privacy.254  
The court recounted a number of instances in which the Supreme Court had 
been granted the opportunity to recognize such a broad right but chose not to 
do so.  Further, the Eleventh Circuit noted that, in Lawrence, the Supreme 
Court only established that criminal prohibitions on consensual adult sodomy 
 
 245. See Williams v. Att’y Gen., 378 F.3d 1232, 1233 (11th Cir. 2004) (quoting ALA. CODE 
§ 13A-12-200.2 (Supp. 2003)). 
 246. See ALA. CODE § 13A-12-200.2 (2020). 
 247. See id. 
 248. See Williams, 378 F.3d at 1233–34. 
 249. Id. at 1234–35. 
 250. Id. at 1235. 
 251. Id. at 1239. 
 252. See Brief of Defendants-Appellees at 31–32, Williams, 378 F.3d 1232 (No. 06-11892-
J) (quoting Williams v. King, 420 F. Supp. 2d 1224, 1248 (N.D. Ala. 2006)) (implying that 
any general attack on “morals-based laws” threatens the justifications for widely accepted 
crimes, such as murder, because such crimes “are premised, fundamentally,  
on a shared and inherited public morality”). 
 253. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 592 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 254. See Williams, 378 F.3d at 1235–36. 
2020] DUE PROCESS AND SEXUAL LIBERTY 223 
are unconstitutional, intentionally failing to elevate a new fundamental right.  
Also, the Eleventh Circuit concluded that it was constrained from 
interpreting Lawrence as recognizing a fundamental right, since Lawrence 
did not use Glucksberg’s fundamental rights analysis and the Supreme Court 
struck down the Texas sodomy law at issue on rational basis review.255  The 
Eleventh Circuit also concluded that if the Lawrence majority considered a 
broader right at all, it was in scattered dicta and had been “left for another 
day.”256 
Concluding that Lawrence did not establish a fundamental right that would 
trigger strict scrutiny, the Eleventh Circuit then utilized its own Glucksberg 
analysis.257  After reciting the history of Lawrence and Glucksberg, it 
concluded that the right implicated was the “right to sell and purchase sexual 
devices.”258  However, recognizing that prohibiting the distribution of sex 
toys infringed upon an individual’s ability to use sex toys, the court also 
considered whether the Constitution protects a right to use such devices.259  
Thus, the Eleventh Circuit carefully described the right at issue in line with 
Glucksberg, aiming to construct a formulation of substantive due process 
interests that sought to ensure that the only rights considered or expanded 
were those squarely before the court. 
The Eleventh Circuit in Williams then turned to Glucksberg’s second 
prong—whether the right is deeply rooted in history and tradition and 
implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.260  Importantly, this analysis was 
tightly constrained because of the court’s narrow framing of the issue.261  If, 
for instance, the court had framed the issue in terms of sexual privacy or 
autonomy, the court could have looked to a wider range of legal and political 
traditions that respect the choices of consenting adults.  However, by limiting 
the right at issue to only the right to use sex toys, the court was more 
constrained.  The Eleventh Circuit also pointed out that the historical analysis 
did not hinge on whether the activity at issue had been observed over the 
course of U.S history but rather on whether U.S. laws and legal traditions had 
protected a right to use sex toys over the course of U.S. history.262  From 
there, the court found that, to the extent that U.S. statutory and common law 
had considered sex toys, it had not condoned them and, at times, prohibited 
their use.  Therefore, the Eleventh Circuit in Williams found that the use of 
sex toys was not deeply rooted in the nation’s history or traditions.263 
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The final matter the Eleventh Circuit considered was the government’s 
interest in creating a ban on sex toys.264  The court endorsed public morality 
as both inherent in the concept of state police powers and the paradigmatic 
expression of republican democracy.265  Speaking on the “delicate area of 
morals legislation,”266 the court emphasized the role of Alabama’s citizens 
in the democratic process and, conversely, warned of the dangers of 
snatching the issue from the people and shifting its guardian to “unelected 
judges.”267 
III.  THE BROADER PHILOSOPHY OF THE FIFTH AND ELEVENTH CIRCUITS 
The Supreme Court has deployed a variety of tests in the substantive due 
process arena with varying levels of openness to recognizing new rights.268  
This varying methodology is clearly what leads to the divergent results 
between the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits.269  The Fifth Circuit framed the right 
at stake broadly and did not restrict its analysis to history and tradition, 
finding a zone of sexual privacy within the Fourteenth Amendment’s concept 
of liberty that can only be invaded by a compelling interest.270  Conversely, 
the Eleventh Circuit framed the right at issue narrowly.  The court showed 
deference to federalism by recognizing the state’s broad police powers to 
criminalize the commercial sale of sex toys and looked to history and 
tradition to find that using sex toys is not implicit in our concept of ordered 
liberty and therefore not protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.271 
Undoubtedly, the Supreme Court will again consider the boundaries of 
substantive due process in the sexual privacy sphere.  While the Court may 
or may not consider the sex toy issue specifically, the methodology the Court 
uses will likely determine the scope of that right.  This part considers the 
broader ramifications for Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence if the 
Supreme Court were to accept either the Fifth Circuit’s or Eleventh Circuits’ 
methodology.  Part III.A considers the philosophy and ramifications of a 
methodology similar to that used by the Fifth Circuit in Reliable Consultants, 
Inc.  Part III.B considers the philosophy and ramifications of a methodology 
similar to that used by the Eleventh Circuit in Williams. 
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A.  Ramifications of the Fifth Circuit’s Methodology  
The Fifth Circuit, in Reliable Consultants, Inc., supported a broad reading 
of Fourteenth Amendment liberty in the sexual privacy context.272  If the 
Supreme Court were to embrace a methodology aligned with the Fifth 
Circuit’s interpretation of Lawrence, the most far-reaching consequence 
would be an explicit recognition of a fundamental right to sexual privacy and 
autonomy.  Furthermore, when facing claims predicated on this right, the 
Court would not be restrained by “narrowly tailoring” the right and ensuring 
that it is “deeply rooted” in our nation’s history and tradition.  Instead, the 
Court would apply a heightened form of rational basis—not the restrained 
jurist approach of Judge Bork, Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice Scalia, and 
Chief Justice Roberts—but closer to the reasoned judgement described by 
Justice Robert Jackson. 
In Lawrence and Obergefell, the Court refrained from explicitly 
recognizing a right to sexual privacy.273  However, Lawrence acknowledges 
that Justice Stevens’s dissent in Bowers was the better decision, and Reliable 
Consultants, Inc. explicitly relies on it as a key part of the jurisprudential 
groundwork for its holdings.274  Therefore, if the Supreme Court were to 
embrace the Reliable Consultants, Inc. methodology, Justice Stevens’s 
Bowers dissent may be insightful for how such a methodology would operate 
in practice.  He begins his analysis with two significant propositions. 
First, Justice Stevens proposed that the fact that a majority of a state finds 
a particular practice immoral is not, on its own, a sufficient justification for 
prohibiting the practice.275  Crucially, this is the clearest statement from the 
Court that public morality is not a sufficient stand-alone justification for 
infringing on the personal liberties of consenting adults’ private sexual 
experiences.276  Second, he asserted that individuals’ decisions concerning 
their intimate relationships—whether married or unmarried and whether 
intended to produce offspring or not—are a protected form of liberty under 
the Due Process Clause.277  Again, this is significant because, for Justice 
Stevens, the right to intimacy precedes a substantive due process right.278  
Thus, the question is not whether any individual activity which may implicate 
intimate relationships is itself fundamental but rather whether it can properly 
be related to the existing liberty interest in private intimacy.279  Finally, 
Justice Stevens explains that the state has a legitimate interest in encouraging 
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and, to a certain extent, defining the parameters of relationships.280  
However, he also explains that the state’s interest ends when those couples 
are in private because the way they choose to conduct their intimate 
expression is not a matter for the state.281 
The Reliable Consultants, Inc. court added to the analysis in two 
significant ways.  First, after recognizing the right described by Justice 
Stevens, it focused its analysis on the burden the statute places “on the 
individual’s right to make private decisions about consensual intimate 
conduct.”282  This is significant because it guides courts to look beyond the 
individual practice at hand and analyze the prohibition’s impact on the 
protected right:  intimate decision-making.283  Second, while the court 
explicitly rejected public morality as a sufficient justification for the law, it 
viewed the justification in light of legitimate interests in infringing on 
intimate decision-making, such as when it implicates minors, coercion, 
public conduct, or prostitution.284  Therefore, the Reliable Consultants, Inc. 
court pushed back on the fear of a slippery slope or overly expansive right by 
establishing a harm principle. 
This analysis would also be in line with the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Obergefell.285  Obergefell introduced two ideas that could be dispositive of 
the issue of sex toys specifically and of future substantive due process cases 
more broadly.  First, Obergefell’s reliance on consensus and societal attitudes 
would likely push the Court toward finding that bans on sex toys violate the 
Fourteenth Amendment, as the United States and other western democracies 
have adopted increasingly progressive views of sexuality and, perhaps more 
importantly, increasingly progressive views on the ability of individuals to 
decide for themselves what their sexual identities and experiences entail.286  
Second, the Obergefell Court’s discussion of the connection between equal 
protection and substantive due process may also be informative287 because 
laws banning sex toys are likely to most negatively impact LGBTQIA+ 
couples,288 whom the Court has already protected under the animus 
doctrine,289 and couples or individuals who are unable to engage in intimacy 
without sexual devices.290 
Thus, the next time the Court considers a state law that burdens private 
decision-making, Reliable Consultants, Inc. would guide it toward rejecting 
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morality as a sufficient justification on its own and instead toward looking at 
harm or coercion as a justifying principle.  As for methodology, the Court 
would place a higher premium on private decision-making and a smaller 
premium on deference to state police powers and common-law prohibitions. 
B.  Ramifications of the Eleventh Circuit’s Methodology  
The Eleventh Circuit’s substantive due process methodology is grounded 
in the idea that the scope of substantive protections offered by the Fourteenth 
Amendment is narrow and that judges should take the utmost care before 
recognizing a new right.291  This formulation values principles of federalism 
and relies on the democratic process to root out laws that no longer represent 
the moral judgments of a state, carried out by the state’s electoral 
decisions.292  Additionally, by holding that a liberty interest can only be 
recognized by a court if it is deeply rooted in American history and tradition, 
it configures the Due Process Clause to preserve certain common-law rights, 
as opposed to rooting out new forms of discrimination or overreach that no 
longer fit comfortably in the nation’s body politic.293 
Just as Reliable Consultants, Inc. is the progeny of Lawrence and Justice 
Stevens’s dissent in Bowers, Williams finds its roots in Glucksberg.294  For 
both Glucksberg and Williams, the historical analysis is extensive and looks 
to origins in U.S. law as well as the broader common-law tradition.295  The 
real work of the Glucksberg methodology is done in framing the interest, 
because that sets the groundwork for testing the right against history.296  
However, while the Glucksberg Court framed the interest as the “right to 
commit suicide which itself includes a right to assistance in doing so,”297 the 
Williams court framed the interest more narrowly as the right to use devices 
to stimulate one’s genital organs.298  The framing of the right is so significant 
because the broader the asserted right, the easier it is to connect it with other 
accepted liberty interests and vindicate a claim.299  However, the Williams 
methodology would likely lead to a narrower substantive due process 
methodology because, unlike Glucksberg, Williams narrowed the right down 
to the specific means of the activity, rather than the activity itself.300 
An adoption of the Eleventh Circuit’s jurisprudential approach would also 
emphasize the democratic process and public debate over the Court’s 
reasoned judgment.  Specifically, the Court would be less likely to take an 
asserted liberty interest and remove it from the states’ police powers if there 
were active legislation on the topic and a robust public debate underway.  In 
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adopting this approach, the Court would be recognizing prudential concerns, 
democratic legitimacy, and principles of federalism. 
IV.  RESOLUTION 
This Note argues that in substantive due process cases where the asserted 
liberty interest is intimacy or sexual autonomy, Lawrence and Obergefell 
instruct a broader test, such as the one applied in Reliable Consultants, Inc., 
and that the narrower test used in Williams is inappropriate.  The complicated 
and controversial history of substantive due process, from the Lochner era to 
today, demonstrates that there are two tests for substantive due process 
claims.  On the one hand, when the liberty interest is intimacy and self-
definition, the Court focuses on a broader conception of liberty and the 
implications a violation has on all aspects of personal rights.  The Court does 
not sustain bare morals as a justification for the invasion.  Further, in these 
cases, the Court does not need to determine whether the specific liberty 
interest is one that is deeply rooted and narrowly tailored in our nation’s 
history and tradition.  Rather it may decide whether the government’s 
intrusion offends an aspect of liberty—here, privacy and sexual autonomy 
vis-à-vis the use, possession, or sale of sex toys—that the Due Process Clause 
has traditionally protected in its substantive form and that the government 
cannot trample on, regardless of the process.  On the other hand, when a claim 
is detached from sexual liberty and intimacy, such as the right to die,301 and 
the government regulation is closer to traditional conceptions of the states’ 
police powers, the Court adopts a stricter test that frames the right narrowly 
and only finds a right fundamental if it is supported by history and tradition. 
The Court should clarify its substantive due process jurisprudence by 
formally recognizing a liberty interest in sexual privacy and autonomy.  Only 
by openly and honestly recognizing this right can Lawrence and Obergefell 
be honestly interpreted and given their full effect by lower courts.  Reliable 
Consultants, Inc. does that by recognizing that the Supreme Court established 
an expanded scope of liberty that the state cannot invade without a 
compelling interest in cases of sexual privacy. 
CONCLUSION 
The liberty interest of sex toy users and vendors deserves to be recognized 
and protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.  The Court has struggled to 
articulate a consistent methodology for assessing sexual liberty claims, but 
as long as Romer, Lawrence, and Obergefell are good law, it is clear that 
courts must take an expansive view of sexual liberty.  These cases instruct 
courts to examine history (but not be controlled by it), consider the liberty 
interest in light of the status of those affected, review and evaluate evolving 
social standards and views, and understand that laws burdening private, 
sexual decision-making are inherently suspect.  Taken together, the liberty 
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interest implicated by sex toy use—private, intimate decision-making—is a 
liberty interest that the Fourteenth Amendment protects. 
